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REGULATORY-SCIENCE: BIPHASIC CANCER MODELS OR THE LNT—NOT
JUST A MATTER OF BIOLOGY!
Paolo F. Ricci  Holy Names University, Xiamen University, Xiamen, China and
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Ian R. Sammis  Holy Names University
 There is no doubt that prudence and risk aversion must guide public decisions when
the associated adverse outcomes are either serious or irreversible. With any carcinogen,
the levels of risk and needed protection before and after an event occurs, are determined
by dose-response models. Regulatory law should not crowd out the actual beneficial effects
from low dose exposures—when demonstrable—that are inevitably lost when it adopts the
linear non-threshold (LNT) as its causal model. Because regulating exposures requires
planning and developing protective measures for future acute and chronic exposures,
public management decisions should be based on minimizing costs and harmful expo-
sures. We address the direct and indirect effects of causation when the danger consists of
exposure to very low levels of carcinogens and toxicants. The societal consequences of a
policy can be deleterious when that policy is based on a risk assumed by the LNT, in cases
where low exposures are actually beneficial. Our work develops the science and the law of
causal risk modeling: both are interwoven. We suggest how their relevant characteristics
differ, but do not attempt to keep them separated; as we demonstrate, this union, howev-
er unsatisfactory, cannot be severed.
Key words: Cancer, dose-response models, hormesis, biphasic response, ionizing radiation, chemical
exposures
INTRODUCTION
The two natural events—earthquake and resulting tsunami—that
caused the catastrophes that so greatly affected Japan in early 2011 have
also had an immediate impact on energy policies of countries that
depend on nuclear energy. Once again, the development and safety of
nuclear power is questioned. The natural events caused partial core melt-
downs and accidents involving spent nuclear fuel stored on the site of the
six Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. The
loss of coolant accidents (LOCAs) caused releases of cancer causing
radionuclides. As with any carcinogen (chemical or radionuclide), the
level of risk and protection before and after accidents is determined by
dose-response functions based on different studies.
We address causation when the effect of very low exposures to car-
cinogens on human health. It is here that many can be exposed to low lev-
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els of radiation for some periods of time near, and at great distances, from
the source of danger. The causal question is exemplified by this question:
What is the level of danger—if any—from inhalation or ingestion of
radionuclides at levels around milli-Sieverts (mSv) per unit of exposure
time? The corollary policy question is: What is a prudent level of tolera-
ble exposure, and what if that exposure is demonstrably benign at low
doses or dose rates, contrary to the prevailing hypothesis? Although dif-
ferent age groups respond differently to ionizing radiation (children are
more sensitive than adults), the question is important for setting both
ambient (routine) and emergency exposure standards. The latter expo-
sures are much less controversial than the former: there is no disputing
the acute effects of ionizing radiation or chemicals at high doses.
The correct answers can avoid costly policies that can do more harm
than good (at a clearly determinable overall cost to the nation), help to
optimize responses to the non-acute consequences, help to address “fear
of cancer”, and provides defensible choices of future sources of energy in
which nuclear power plays a prominent role. Although the answers we pro-
vide are guarded, the essence of our proposal is that—given the necessary (scientif-
ic) and sufficient (legal) information for policy-science—a sound choice between
alternative causal models of dose-response should be made. That choice should
avoid a hypothesis, given the gravity of the consequences to society. More
specifically, we will attempt to show that it is not at all clear that the lin-
ear, non-threshold dose response model (LNT) should be assumed with-
out evidence and used to set tolerable levels of exposure. In the longer
term, even when the risk of danger disappears (depending on the half-
life of the radionuclides emitted from the accident), the imprint of fear
can lead to energy policies that create other perhaps much less uncertain
dangers. Those can result in adopting costlier energy sources, depend-
encies on inimical suppliers, raise the carbon footprint of a nation, and
so on. The correct choice of dose-response model has implications that
go well beyond excess cancer incidence: the analysis of trade-offs begins
locally but has global impact.
Lack of knowledge argues for prudence and risk aversion. Both are
context-specific: it is stupefying that the magnitude 9 (Richter magnitude
scale) was not designed against as it was not considered when it is estab-
lished that these magnitudes have a (worldwide) rate of 1 to 3 per centu-
ry (McCaffrey, 2008). The reason for surprise is not just the lack of fore-
sight about the design choice (a barrier wall to withstand a tsunami about
half as high as that experienced), but also that the number of reactors on
site (there were six). In foresight, the stakes in the decision are so great for
Japan (and all of us) that a design for magnitude 9 would have been pru-
dent and necessary, given the potential societal damage. It would provide
“the ample margin of safety” required for a correct policy choice when
the outcomes are extremely high and the direct and indirect costs
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
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approach the half trillion dollar mark. The correct analysis and optimal
choice of protection normatively should be based on the net value of the
stakes associated with very low probability events. On the one hand, there
will be losses of large magnitude, even though the probabilities are rela-
tively low. On the other, the correct analysis also would account for ben-
eficial effects from low exposure, even though those exposures do kill at
much greater doses. In this paper we consider both of these dimensions.
In most countries, regulatory risk analysis uses causation, through dose-
response models: it is part of the legal basis for justifying the reduction of
exposures to hazardous agents likely to cause cancer that are either
assumed or presumed1 to lead to very small individual lifetime risk (relative
to background). In the aggregate, the overall expected number of cancers
can, however, be significant but still undetectable, given the much larger
background numbers of cancers in the population. Unless cases or deaths
can be uniquely associated with a particular exposure (for leukemia, for
instance, cigarettes smoke and not ionizing radiation, even though the
individual was a smoker), the apportionment of risk is unfeasible.
Because regulating exposure to carcinogens requires direct and indi-
rect expenditures measured in billions of dollars per year, a public man-
agement decision should be based on minimizing exposures, but also
should account for all other (e.g., economic) costs associated with any
such minimization; this balancing is inherent to setting environmental
and occupational standards in many US federal laws. To set those stan-
dards, the law (from tort to environmental to constitutional law) couples
legal causation and the “best science”2 about cause and effect to regula-
tory policy-making. The potential for judicial reviews of a regulatory
choice is assumed to limit the scope of an agency freedom to act arbi-
trarily: the overall system is assumed to yield, on the average, optimal
social outcomes. Hazardous exposures are regulated (e.g., via numerical
standards limiting hourly exposure) at either acceptable or tolerable
risks. For example, a one in a million chance of cancer death yields the
corresponding tolerable exposure, for a given causal model of dose-
response (Table 1).3 Moreover, an important function of a public agency
is to inform the public and stakeholders affected about the regulatory
intent and the scientific basis of its regulations. These combine elements
of policy with a choice of causal model and data.
The characterizations of regulatory risks conditions its estimates on
the advances in scientific knowledge, provided that this knowledge has
been corroborated through independent replications, empirical and the-
oretical findings, confirmation by predictions, and is scrutinized via peer
reviews and other examinations—including judicial review. However, this
last review can paradoxically result in a policy bias that conflicts—for
instance, allowing far too great latitude to regulatory agencies—with that
scientifically best characterization of risks. More specifically, the conse-
P. F. Ricci and I. R. Sammis
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quences of a policy bias towards high level of safety, as we will demon-
strate in this paper, can be deleterious because it becomes entrenched.
From a seemingly unrelated field, quantum physics—following Sokal and
Bricmont (1999)—we find that Heisenberg’s (1958) statement that:
Science no longer confronts nature as an objective observer, but sees
itself as an actor in this interplay between man and nature ... method
and object can no longer be separated.
This is particularly true at the macro-state, namely policy-science. It is
equally clear that, as Bohr (1928) suggests:
An independent reality in the ordinary physical sense can ... neither
be ascribed to the phenomenon nor to the agencies of observation.
We thus need to confront not only scientific but also the perceptual
(cognitive) aspects of low probability events with large consequences. The
modern interaction of science and policy to issue regulatory numbers
effectively nullifies the ideal that science can be separated from policy. As
we discuss, we see no convincing evidence of this ideal occurs.4 Rather, we
clearly see an application of Bell’s result in which an event affects juris-
dictions thousands of kilometers away. First, scientific knowledge,
Figure 1 (Ricci, 2009), changes with time and, if it is not reflected in reg-
ulatory laws, results in an incomplete analysis of the true risks—resulting
in a positive feedback that decreases safety, rather than increase it.
Second, regulatory inertia to change and judicial inertia can fail to pro-
vide the very protection that they are designed to provide by law.
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
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TABLE 1. Concentrations of cadmium, from alternative cancer risks dose-response models 
Alternative Dose-response Models and Individual Lifetime Cancer Risks
Concentrations, µg/m3, Linearized Multistage, One-hit Cancer Model Weibull Cancer Model 
of Cadmium, at each LMS, Cancer Model (LNT) (LNT)
of the risk in the next (LNT)
three columns
1 1.8×10-7 2.0×10-7 4.8×10-10
10 1.8×10-6 1.8×10-6 1.7×10-8
100 1.8×10-5 1.8×10-5 6.1×10-6
1,000 1.8×10-4 1.8×10-4 2.0×10-5
10,000 1.8×10-3 1.8×10-3 6.1×10-4
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CAUSATION AT LOW DOSES
The essence of the scientific issue we discuss is exemplified by the dif-
ferences between the US and the French Academies (i.e., the US
National Academies of Science, the French Academy of Sciences, and the
French National Academy of Medicine) regarding the effects of ionizing
radiations at low doses. Although the US (BEIR VII, Phase 2 Report) sup-
ported the LNT, the French Academies raised doubts about its validity.
The US used epidemiological studies; France instead included in vitro
cell line results. Although these alternative choices are unambiguous, the
result for regulatory law is ambiguity: alternative and essentially diamet-
rically opposite views—given that the very same level of scientific knowl-
edge is available to all of these institutions—create a difficult regulatory
situation that affects environmental choices and energy development,
and thus have important implications for geopolitical stability.
It should not be controversial to ask for a decision theoretic analysis
of how those choices are made. This analysis would account for experi-
mental (e.g., short-term tests, bioassays on live animals, and epidemio-
logical studies) scientific evidence, the biology associated with the can-
cers, combines those and points to the correct regulatory choice for a
socially acceptable criterion of choice. The advantage is that external
reviewers can assess the choice made by those institutions analytically.
Specifically, the weights given to alternative biological and experimental
information—common to all—would have to be disclosed and could be
assessed by unbiased parties, given the criterion for the optimal choice.
The policy issue we confront is one of cause and effect via cancer dose-
response models. These can yield very different results, for the same set
P. F. Ricci and I. R. Sammis
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FIGURE 1. Simultaneity of a societal concern with hazardous condition, knowledge, truth, and
uncertainty about causation. 
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of data, as the results shown in Table 1 suggest: each is an alternative
cumulative (thus monotonic) distribution functions used in current reg-
ulatory practice. The setting of the tolerable risk, from which we develop
tolerable exposures, is a matter of social policy.
These models are used in current regulatory practice in the US and
in those jurisdictions that follows the US approach. In the EU, several
Member States use T25, NOAEL, and LOAEL methods (based on the pro-
bit model) to develop tolerated exposure or doses. Some use the single
and two-hit models of cancer and the 0.99 UCL to develop the tolerable
exposure; while other pool scientists to develop a consensus opinion
(Seely et al., 2001). Although some countries, for example Australia, mod-
ify the method, the foundational regulatory basis is the LNT at low doses.
However, those foreign interpretations and uses have different constitu-
tional and administrative frameworks than those of the original jurisdic-
tion which developed these methods and standards, and are thus of ques-
tionable policy use because those affected may not have the recourses for
redress available in the original jurisdiction under its laws.
Policy choices not based on sound methods neither resolve ambigui-
ty nor increase protection; less protection may be likely despite the large
sums spent to reduce what turns out to be a phantom hazard, created by
conservative (erring on the side of precaution) assumptions. For cancer
risk assessments, regulatory agencies (e.g., US EPA, 2005) default to lin-
earity at low doses:
... extrapolation is based on extension of a biologically based model if
supported by substantial data. Otherwise, default approaches can be
applied that are consistent with current understanding of mode(s) of
action of the agent, including approaches that assume linearity or
nonlinearity of the dose-response relationship, or both. A default
approach for linearity extends a straight line from the POD to zero
dose/zero response. The linear approach is used when: (1) there is
an absence of sufficient information on modes of action or (2) the
mode of action information indicates that the dose- response curve at
low dose is or is expected to be linear. Where alternative approaches
have significant biological support, and no scientific consensus favors
a single approach, an assessment may present results using alternative
approaches.
Our overall context is Figure 1, which depicts the two alternatives at
issue in this paper: the LNT hypothesis and its biphasic-hormetic (B-H)
alternative. The regulatory science importance of this issue is that, as the
depiction shows, the LNT excludes any benefit from any exposure; the B-
H allows such benefit to be quantified, when it exists. From an analysis
that uses either one or the other causal model, exposure is the regulated
to minimize cancer incidence or deaths. However, if the form of dose-
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
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response is conjectural—it is an assumption—while its alternative has a
fundamental empirical and theoretical basis—it is a presumption—then
it would seem, legally and logically, that those who are exposed and those
who regulate exposure should have full knowledge of both alternatives.
Using one as a policy default is scientifically and legally unjustifiable even
though it is done routinely; as we will discuss. By direct implication, fears
of low dose radiation may be misplaced if the B-H were correct, as the B-
H predicts beneficial results for those exposures.
Our Figure 1 appears as a mixture of relativisms, empiricism, and
other –isms. This is not our intent. We are only concerned with misallo-
cation of societal resources, given the immediacy of danger. Our figure
depicts a situation-specific event that generates societal concerns with a
deadly hazard and links that event to actions (such as R&D) taken by soci-
ety to understand the factual basis of the event and its consequences over
time. The goal of society is reduce or eliminate exposure to that hazard
but such reduction should not create other and possibly greater dangers.
We use empirical and theoretical results over time, and predict that the
gap between “truth” and the results from theory and empirical studies
would eventually narrow. Given these, we also show that—on the aver-
age—fear for the hazard and its consequences diminish as a function of
increased understanding and coping measures taken as knowledge
increases. This reduction in concern is based on: 1) “theory” is falsifiable
and 2) that “truth” will eventually become verifiable. More specifically, we
find it difficult to accept a proposition that purports to be conservative
when its conservativism is based on a hypothesis that cannot be tested and
both theoretical and empirical knowledge disconfirms it. To the extent
that the law requires proof of an event (or chain of events leading to dam-
ages) and that legal proofs balance the evidence for and against with a
specific balancing (e.g., of the probabilities for the more likely than not, test;
or factual as for clear and convincing evidence, and so on), we think that a
hypothesis cannot have the same probative vale of corroborated factual evi-
dence. Nonetheless, the reason for our ambivalence is that it is probable
that a hypothesis has to be made, and policy be based on it, when the sit-
uation warrants it. But, we hope that—when this occurs—the hypothesis
well summarizes what is known at the time that the societal choice is
made. The asymmetries regarding the probable convergence of the tra-
jectories on the scientific “truth” and the possible reduction in average
societal concern involve. Different rates of convergence on the “truth”,
should convergence actually occur. The basis for asymmetry and possible
non convergence include: perceptions of the hazard (and thus the level
of concern) which change at different rates (e.g., depending on individ-
ual age and other factors); knowledge—information and the processing
of that information—changes at yet different rates; uncertainty (e.g., ran-
domness) cannot be fully resolved. Even though we show the evolution of
P. F. Ricci and I. R. Sammis
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different processes continuously, the events characterizing them over
time are discrete. Finally, “truth” in this Figure means a scientific known
or discoverable truth.
To sum up, a mathematical (i.e., biostatistical) model is used to deter-
mine public or occupational tolerable exposures, from a policy-generated
acceptable risk number (Table 1). In other words, a policy-mandated prob-
ability of cancer conditional on the causal dose-response model deter-
mines the tolerable exposure and the eventual cost of cleaning up to, or
reducing, that exposure. It does not matter that exposure can be meas-
ured by alternative metrics, such as: dose, dose rate, cumulative exposure
or by some other plausible metric of hazard. A policy statement deter-
mines the hazard (e.g., zero risk = zero probability of response and thus zero
dose, dose rate or cumulative exposure). US regulatory law (e.g., food,
cosmetics, occupational, environmental and so on) distinguishes between
cancer and non-cancer (toxic) dose-response models. We focus on envi-
ronmental health and cancer risk assessment in which the effect of expo-
sure is generally assessed using the (linearized) multistage (LMS) dose-
response model (US EPA, 2003). The probability of carcinogenic
response is the individual lifetime cumulative probability; the upper 95%
confidence limit of the estimated slope (the linear term of the LMS) is
used to determine tolerable dose, for a given regulatory level of tolerable
risk (e.g., 1×10-6). The construction of the LNT cannot account for ben-
efits, even when they actually exist empirically because it is forced to be
interpolated through the (0,0) origin of the dose and response axes.
More specifically, the cancer dose-response model most often used by the
US EPA is the linearized multistage model, LMS, which forces linearity at
low doses and does not admit a threshold at low doses (risk is lifetime
individual probability):
(1)
All higher powers of d, with the exception of the zeroth and first
power, are discarded. The USEPA uses q1, i.e., the first power of d and its
upper 95% confidence bound, the so-called q1*. The LMS model con-
strains the coefficients (parameters in statistical estimation) to be greater
or equal to zero, resulting in a monotonic function (it is a cumulative life-
time distribution). This is why this model cannot account for any B-H the-
oretical and empirical reality: in the LMS model the exponent in equa-
tion (1) is linear at low doses and interpolates to (0, 0).
The LMS can be shown to be incorrect, when the number of data
used in fitting it is larger than the number of parameters being estimat-
ed; however this is not generally the case because of the design of the
experiments to which this model is applied. Nonetheless, there are
notable exceptions. For example, experimental results obtained in the
Risk d q di
i( ) exp= − −( )∑1
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
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mid 1970s by an US FDA long-term bioassay study with over 24,000 mice
exposed to the carcinogen 2-AAF to determine the shape of the dose
response at low doses (because of its size, this study is known as the mega-
mouse experiment). Despite the very large (and yet unmatched in size)
number of animals used, the results were only sensitive to a risk of 1/100,
much less than the risk levels used by regulatory agencies to set tolerable
doses or exposures. Importantly, the US Society of Toxicology (SOT,
Bruce et al., 1981) 14-member expert panel reviewed the results of the
mega-mouse study and reported that the study supported a B-H dose
response model, when the analysis included a time component based on
interim sacrifices. The SOT found that 2-AAF had a J-shaped dose
response for bladder cancers that was consistent in each of the six sepa-
rate rooms in which large number of animals were housed, an important
internal replication. This study points to a practical problem in many, if
not all, whole animal lifetime cancer studies: the size of the study
becomes so overwhelming that it is unfeasible to carry out. Thus: How
can anyone demonstrate dose-response behaviors below an excess risk of
about 1/100, even though the risks of concern are much lower than this
number? The biphasic model of Figures 2 and 3 depicts low dose reduc-
tion and high dose increase in the incidence of the adverse effect: The
empirical form of the B-H cancer dose-response is depicted, for 2-AAF’s
mega-mouse experiment, in Figure 3.
P. F. Ricci and I. R. Sammis
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FIGURE 2. Alternative dose-response models for cancer: LNT and biphasic (hormetic) models.
(points are enlarged for representation purpose). 
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MODELS OF DAMAGE
The fundamental problem with modeling the risks of extremely low
doses is that measuring the response directly becomes exceedingly diffi-
cult. When the predicted response is very low, as in cases of (for example)
chronic exposure to radiation at levels similar to or slightly above back-
ground levels (levels of a few mSv/y), extracting a signal from the noise
of the host of confounding factors—other carcinogens, varying levels of
healthiness pre-exposure, and a wide array of risk factors other than the
carcinogen in question—may well be impossible. This means that the
qualitative features of the response (even its sign!) may be unknowable.
In trying to create public policy around such exposures, we are thus
confronted with the worst possible case imaginable—a tiny, unknowable
signal that must be multiplied by a vast number of potential cases to
determine the possible level of harm involved. Systems in which a tiny
error is magnified to create a much larger signal are said to be ill-condi-
tioned. The thoughtless use of an ill-conditioned procedure runs the risk
of producing an approximate solution that is nothing of the sort—a solu-
tion in which errors can easily grow to be large enough that even the basic
nature of the answer—much less its magnitude—may be fundamentally
wrong. To see the problem, consider the following three models for the
biological response putative carcinogen, where x=0 represents 0 dose and
x=1 represents the highest dose under consideration, at which we expect
a rate of R. In these models, xt may be interpreted as a very low dose,
much lower than any expected background dose. Let
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
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FIGURE 3. Biphasic Exposure-Response Model (J-shaped) for Exposure to 2-AAF in the ED01 Mouse
Experiment; Percent of Control Animal Responses as a Function of Exposure (Bruce et al., 1981). 
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,, and
.
The three response curves are nearly indistinguishable for most val-
ues of x. At values of a few xt, though, they show strikingly different behav-
ior—f1 continues to show positive harm, f2 exhibits no harm below the
threshold exposure xt, and f3 exhibits J-shaped (biphasic hormetic)
behavior. Figure 4 plots these functions first at significant fractions of 1,
then around xt .
At significant fractions of the maximum dose, the three curves appear
to be identical. At smaller scales, the distinct behavior of the three curves
becomes apparent.
If the measured exposure is xt/2 on a large population P, policymak-
ers are in an unenviable position. According to response function f1, the
small exposure should give rise to an expected PRxt/2 cases of cancer;
according to f2 none at all, and according to f3 the exposure should actu-
ally prevent 
cases per year.
Given this sort of uncertainty, and given that measurements of very
low-level responses are likely to be extraordinarily difficult to make with
any accuracy given the host of possible confounding factors at very small
scales, crafting public policy using “the best science” in the traditional way
may be impossible.
Let us instead consider the problem in a decision-theoretic frame-
work. There are three components to dealing with an environmental haz-
ard of the sort discussed in here. First, the actual dose x must be meas-
ured as accurately as possible. Any such measurement will necessarily
have some degree of error. Secondly, the response to this dose must be
estimated using the best available science. This is straightforward for
large x (in our example, for x > xt), where the linear dose-response curve
is well established, but enormously difficult for small x. Finally, the legal
consequences of that response must be worked out. This step is highly dif-
ferent in different jurisdictions. As a baseline, we assume a model legal
system adhering to two principles:
f x x x
R x x x x x
t
t t t
2
0
1
=
<
−( ) −( ) ≥
⎧
⎨⎪
⎩⎪
⎫
⎬⎪
⎭⎪/
f x Rx R r xe x xt3 1( ) /= − +( ) −
P R x e R x et t1
1 2 1 2
2 2
1− −− −( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
/ /
f x Rx1( ) =
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• It attempts, by some mechanism, to assign damages proportional to a
given entity’s proportional blame for damages. Thus, if a single entity is
shown to have caused some harm largely on its own, it is assigned the
damages caused by that harm. The actual mechanism by which damages
are apportioned may vary wildly—damages may be assigned first to a sin-
gle entity, for example, which may then bring its own claims against other
parties with which it shares responsibility—but we assume that at the end
of legal proceedings damages have been assigned more or less fairly.
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
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FIGURE 4. Alternative results and the paradox of high versus low dose: at significant fractions of the
maximum tolerated dose, the three curves appear to be identical. 
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• It establishes a standard of proof (preponderance of the evidence, be-
yond a reasonable doubt, or some other standard) that a claim of harm
must meet for damages to be assessed.
Let us consider a few characteristic cases:
1. One polluter, well determined dose In this case, although x is well deter-
mined, f(x) is not. In fact, as sgn(f(x)) isn’t known, the science can’t
even establish the existence of harm, must less the magnitude. In a
heavily-populated region, Nf(x), the expected number of cases per
year, now potentially covers an enormous range.
In this case, claiming that the “conservative” decision is the one that
avoids the greatest possible harm is somewhat dangerous. It invites a
sort of arms race between interested parties in which each side attempts
to measure the immeasurable in a manner most favorable to their po-
sition. Attempts to study phenomena within the noise level of an ex-
periment have historically led to disaster (Langmuir & Hall, 1989).
2. Many polluters, well-determined collective dose x>>xt, delivered in partial doses
such that each polluter Pi causes xi < xt of the total dose. This time f is on
the solidly established linear response portion of the curve. The ulti-
mate result depends entirely upon how the specific jurisdiction
decides to apportion damages.
If the damages are apportioned according to the fractional responsi-
bility for the dose, then the ultimate damages will be precisely those
expected by LNT, albeit with a significantly different justification.
The two cases are instructive. The LNT model makes sense as a reg-
ulatory device if one expects the number of polluters to be quite
high, so that the total dose may be much larger than the dose for
which any individual polluter might be responsible. It is a much more
dubious proposition in cases in which a sole low-level polluter exists.
The key is that it is much more reasonable to scale down a well under-
stood harm to the scale at which individual entities are responsible
than to scale up a poorly understood harm by multiplying it by a large
population.
3. A single polluter polluting near xt; background rate Rb of the adverse event.
Here a single polluter is polluting quite near the threshold level. We
assume a background rate for the adverse event is Rb, even in the ab-
sence of the pollutant. What is the probability that a specific adverse
event has been caused by the pollution? In this case, the total rate of
the adverse event is f + Rb, so the fraction of the rate due to the pollu-
tion is f/(f + Rb) for positive f.When these claims are addressed by the
legal system, then, harm is said to have occurred whenever f/(f + Rb)
exceeds some threshold probability T. Figure 5 plots f/(f + Rb) for Rb
= 10Rxt, 100Rxt, and 1000Rxt (A, B, and C respectively).
P. F. Ricci and I. R. Sammis
132
13
Ricci and Sammis: Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 2014
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
133
FIGURE 5A. Difference in results due to the gap between dose-response models. Rb = 10Rxt . 
FIGURE 5B. Rb = 100Rxt . 
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In this case, if the standard is something like “better than even odds”
that the specific harm is due to the low-level exposure, then the differ-
ence between LNT and BH is irrelevant; by that point the danger should
be readily measurable. Regulations are usually designed to prevent expo-
sures well below the level at which the rate of adverse effects doubles. This
can be problematic in the face of a difficult-to-detect gap between possi-
ble dose-response curves at low-levels—in an area like the Los Angeles
basin, the tiny difference between the curves in the third case might rep-
resents the difference between no deaths and a few dozen per year.
DISCUSSION
Our paradigm is invariant to the jurisdiction using it, provided that
science and policy mix to create a regulatory framework in which causa-
tion is a necessary—but not sufficient—legal requirement. We are con-
sistent and supplement the US EPA (2005) attempt to:
“[Encourage] risk assessors to be receptive to new scientific informa-
tion, [following the US National Research Council, NRC, comments]
... need for departures from default options when a ‘sufficient show-
ing’ is made. [The NRC] ... called on EPA to articulate clearly its cri-
teria for a departure so that decisions to depart from default options
P. F. Ricci and I. R. Sammis
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would be ‘scientifically credible and receive public acceptance’
[because] [i]t was concerned that ad hoc departures would undercut
the scientific credibility of a risk assessment. NRC envisioned that
principles for choosing and departing from default options would
balance several objectives, including ‘protecting the public health,
ensuring scientific validity, minimizing serious errors in estimating
risks, maximizing incentives for research, creating an orderly and pre-
dictable process, and fostering openness and trustworthiness.’”
This encouragement emphasizes that causation and policy combine
and that the ideal of keeping science separate from policy cannot be
guaranteed (a result summarized in Figure 1). Nonetheless, our work
decouples, to the extent possible, science from policy-based default rea-
soning and is consistent with scientific skepticism—i.e., that a scientific
investigation begins with the null hypothesis as well as parsimonious
explanations, according to Occam’s Razor. Practically, it is difficult to see
how—given the emphasis of the US EPA on the LMS and its use to set
cancer guideline numbers in its IRIS data base—that practitioners will
take on the costly burdens we discussed and “be receptive to new scien-
tific information,” particularly in the current economy. Litigation and
political forces cause the change: a “sufficient showing” may be a tepid
(and so far seemingly unused) criterion for any necessary and sufficient
evidence of adverse effects, given dose. The reason is that a public
choice—unlike a private choice—is a policy act (US EPA, 2005; paren-
thetic statement added):
“The extent of health protection provided to the public ultimately
depends upon what risk managers decide is the appropriate course of
regulatory action. When risk assessments are performed using only one
set of procedures, it may be difficult for risk managers to determine
how much health protectiveness is built into a particular hazard deter-
mination or risk characterization. When there are alternative proce-
dures having significant biological support, (one of which is the exis-
tence of hormetic mechanisms) the Agency encourages assessments to
be performed using these alternative procedures, if feasible, in order to
shed light on the uncertainties in the assessment, recognizing that the
Agency may decide to give greater weight to one set of procedures than
another in a specific assessment or management decision. “
For regulating exposure to carcinogens, the US EPA (2005) also
requires a weight-of-evidence narrative that should describe:
• the quality and quantity of the data;
• all key decisions and the basis for these major decisions; and
• any data, analyses, or assumptions that are unusual for or new to EPA.
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To account for these, the US EPA (2005) uses a narrative that includes
several items that should include:
• conclusions about human carcinogenic potential ...
• a summary of the key evidence supporting these conclusions (for each
descriptor used), including information on the type(s) of data (human
and/or animal, in vivo and/or in vitro) used to support the conclu-
sion(s),
• available information on the epidemiologic or experimental condi-
tions that characterize expression of carcinogenicity (e.g., if carcino-
genicity is possible only by one exposure route or only above a certain
human exposure level),
• a summary of potential modes of action and how they reinforce the
conclusions,
• indications of any susceptible populations or lifestages, when available,
and
• a summary of the key default options invoked when the available infor-
mation is inconclusive.
Additionally, the US EPA approach accounts for the mode of action and
other biological aspects of a carcinogen. It provides several dose-response
models in its BMDS package that is freely available on line at the US EPA
NCEAS site. Unfortunately, this toolbox does not contain models that
would allow the analysis of biphasic behaviors. The natural language used
in the narrative does not provide a sufficient integrated method: it is
vague and lacks a bright line for determining what is in from what is out.
The previous sections have dealt with parts of this point, we now turn how
this bright line could be studied (and be consistent with the US EPA
approach for cancer risk assessment.)
IONIZING RADIATION: EVIDENCE OF B-H CANCER DOSE-RESPONSE
For ionizing radiation there is incontrovertible evidence that, from
approximately 300 mGy to 2 Gy, the cumulative probability of damage
from exposure is approximately linear (Pollycove and Feinendegen,
2003). High levels of ionizing radiations decrease mean survival time of
those exposed, across all exposed species (UNSCEAR, 1982). This is not
the case for low levels of radiation. Upton (2001) has provided a summa-
ry of experiments which have detected enhanced mean survival times in,
among other species, rats and mouse, from whole-body ionizing radia-
tions. We have abstracted these in Table 2.
The conclusions of a UNSCEAR group of experts of a no effect of “radi-
ation-associated excess” of either mortality risk or incidence of leukemia
adds relevance to these findings. The J-shaped behavior had been demon-
strated by Vilenchik and Knudsen (2006) with regressions for the excess
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relative risk of DSB mutations, and compares well with the epidemiologi-
cal studies. This commonality, because DSBs are a “major mechanisms of
leukemogenesis,” is to the findings of the J-shaped dose–response model
for IR exposure and leukemia. Bogen et al. (1997) developed a biologi-
cally plausible cytodynamic 2-stage model predicting a J-shaped response
for ionizing radiations and shows that his model fits the observed urani-
um miner data. Scott et al. (2007) have developed a model that links dif-
ferent cellular states to the probability of transition from one state to the
other as a function genomic damage induced by different level of expo-
sure to ionizing radiation. They, using a MCMC solution, find a multi-
phasic response that depends on the amount of radiation and repair
mechanisms.
At times, because epidemiological studies may not be designed to test
for biphasic dose-response, the finding of responses lower than the con-
trols (the actual J-effect) is interpreted as the healthy worker effect, health-
ier life styles, and so on. This has been the case for studies at Los Alamos,
Hanford, and other locations where workers exposed to ionizing radia-
tions had lower cancer risk that those unexposed. These explanations
may be clarified. The hormetic effect of very low levels of exposure stim-
ulates the immune system. Similar findings have also been reported in
from non-occupational populations in Taiwan (chronic gamma radiation
from Cobalt-60) and indoor radon exposures (Cohen, 1995), and in
other studies of nuclear workers (in the US, Canada, and the UK) whose
total cancer deaths are lower than those unexposed. Unfortunately, even
when the J-shape occurs, the policy conclusion relates back to linearity at
low doses: evidence is trumped by conjecture (Cardis et al., 2007). A
Canadian epidemiological study of female mortality involving for breast
cancer, where the patients had had several fluoroscopies, was reassessed
by Pollycove (1988): the original report of a LNT effect from those expo-
sures turned out to be not LNT-like but, rather, J-shaped. Schöllnberger
et al. (2007) also comment that the LNT hypothesis is—at low doses—
inconsistent with the empirical results from in vitro studies involving
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
137
TABLE 2. Examples of the Effect of Ionizing Radiation at Low Dose or Low Dose Rates 
Radiation Exposure and duration of exposure Species exposed Effect on Mean Survival Time
Gamma 0.11-8.8 R/day for the duration of life Mouse (M, F) Enhanced at lowest dose rate
in males but not in females
Gamma 0.7-56.7 R/day chronic Mouse (M) Enhanced at lower doses and
dose rates
Gamma 19mGy/day and 38 mGy/day chronic Mouse (F) Enhanced at both dose rates
Gamma 0.1 R/h, 8h/day for duration of life Rat (M) Enhanced
X-rays, 0.5- 3 Gy, acute Mouse (M) Enhanced by lowest dose,
and reduced by highest dose
Neutrons 0.125-1 Gy, acute Mouse (M) Enhanced by lowest dose,
and reduced by highest dose
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exposures to low energy photons (which are used for imaging work, such
as mammography). Radiation damage to cellular DNA (pre- or post-
exposures to mSv levels) has also shown to be characterized by J-shaped
functions for X-and gamma rays (Upton, 2001):
Although the existence of such adaptive responses is no longer in
doubt, it is not clear from the existing data whether the dose-response
relationships for mutagenic, clastogenic, and carcinogenic effects of
radiation are comparably biphasic in the low-dose domain (citations
omitted for brevity). Pending further research to resolve this ques-
tion, the implication of adaptive responses or the setting of radiation
exposure limits will remain uncertain.
As Upton summarizes (2001), beneficial effects were found for
immunological responses (e.g., antibodies, lymphocytes) and apoptosis
in cells of rabbits, sheep, mice, and humans, including human lympho-
cytes and mouse spleen cells, from exposure to gamma and X-rays.
UNSCEAR (1994) and recent studies document the stimulatory effect of
low-LET background radiation (Pollycove and Feinedegen, 2005) on sev-
eral cellular functions, who conclude that the prevention of genetic muta-
tions by increased low-dose radiation is associated with decreased mortality and
decreased cancer mortality in human populations... . The natural experiments
that occur daily—and have done so for tens of thousands of years—pro-
vide additional insights. These experiments occur when people live in
areas with relatively high continuous background radiation (either from
geology or from altitude). What seems to be occurring is that those cer-
tain populations in several areas of the world (in China and in the US, for
instance) have lower background cancer rates than populations with less
exposure: these exposure rates are measured in the milirem
(mrem/year) and the range of exposures is between 400 to 800
mrem/year, or even higher.
POLICY REVISITED
Can science be separated from scientific causal arguments that but-
tress policy? It turns out that this is no longer the proper question to ask.
Instead, it is the use of the science in regulatory law that matters: science
qua science is not in dispute. When science justifies policy using or causing
fear and relying on ignorance then it becomes suspect, even though the
avowed policy end is protection.
Comparability—Jaworowski (2010) reports of the (bogus) six-foot
Chernobyl chicken in depicted in a 1986 issue of the National Enquirer
(with a circulation of 4.4 million in that year and found in most US super-
markets) indicates is a gross, but convincing to many, use of fear from
invisible radioactive cancer agents to generate revenues. If the level of
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expenditures for mitigation or prevention is used to justify public fund-
ing, then accidents that can probabilistically generate deaths, illnesses,
and damage to property and to the environment have to be ranked by
importance. The magnitude and frequency of the outcomes—not neces-
sarily stated as an expected value—should help policy makers and stake-
holders decide on the allocation of increasingly scarce resources. The sec-
ond aspect of the question has to do with the comparability of the causes
of an accident. Comparability requires high similarity between the
sources of danger (the hazards generating risks). Thus, the Chernobyl
accident—due to the type, operations and lack of containment vessels of
the nuclear reactor—cannot be compared to US and the Fukushima
nuclear power plants because these have containment vessels around the
reactors. The TMI partial core meltdown and those at the Daiichi plant
are, on the other hand, at least in part comparable (regarding mecha-
nisms of failure and releases but not regarding the initiating events of the
accident. The cause and effect, in this situation, are known or knowable.
Policy-making—Radon in the drinking water is example of the difficul-
ties that agency rulemaking encounters when dealing with uncertain cau-
sation. A committee of external experts found that the U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency’s (US EPA) “policy and regulations are
frequently perceived as lacking strong scientific foundation.”5 The regu-
latory process for radon began in 1974, and the scientific basis for regu-
lating it still has not gone to Congress in late 1993. The US EPA based its
risk calculations on an unpublished study, estimating that approximately
200 excess cancer deaths would occur in the US per year, and the cost of
each death averted would be approximately 3 million dollars. However,
the US EPA Science Adviser asked the agency to consider the “enormous
uncertainty” about the risk, and that the “maximum contamination level”
might be in the range of 1500 to 2000 pCi/liter, rather than the agency’s
300 pCi/liter. The US EPA Science Advisory Board (SAB) had concluded
that “there is no direct epidemiologic or laboratory animal evidence of
cancer being caused by ingestion of radon in drinking water,” that “it is
not possible to exclude the possibility of zero risk from ingested radon,”
and suggested that 3000 pCi/liter would be appropriate.
Judicial review—Late in 1993, the U. S. Supreme Court addressed the
extent to which scientific results could be admissible in Daubert.6 It had
been held that—given epidemiologic evidence of the effect of
Bendectin7 where the scientific evidence based on chemical structure
activity, in vitro, animal tests, and recalculations which had not been
peer-reviewed, but were based on epidemiologic results, did not meet
the Frye test.8 In Daubert, the unanimous Supreme Court held that the
“general acceptance” of a scientific finding is not required for that finding
to be admissible into evidence,9 rejecting the Frye doctrine.10 The Daubert
Court stated that:
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“(t)he adjective ‘scientific’ implies a grounding in the methods and
procedures of science. Similarly the word ‘knowledge’ connotes more
than subjective belief or unsupported speculation.”11
This Court also added that:
“(o)f course, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the subject of
scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty; arguably there is
no certainty in science.”12
The opinion properly explains the role of peer-review in science pol-
icy as a:
“[R]elevant, though not dispositive, consideration in assessing the sci-
entific validity of a particular technique or methodology on which a
particular technique is premised.” (at 4809).
The Court went on to discuss the difference between legal and scien-
tific analysis, and gave the reason for the difference: “[S]cientific conclu-
sions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must
resolve disputes finally and quickly.”13 The former is unquestionable; the
latter is troublesome because not only is the judicial process notoriously
slow, but, if it depends on scientific information, then it should be able to
accommodate change.14
What is the correct risk level for policy?—In Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO,
v. American Petroleum Institute, 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980). The U.S. Supreme
Court addressed the meaning of “significant risk,” where the
Occupational and Safety Health Agency (OSHA) wanted to reduce expo-
sure to benzene in the workplace, from 10 ppm to 1 ppm based on their
findings that benzene presented a “significant risk of health impairment”
(Occupational Health and Safety Act, 29 U. S. C. § 655(b) (5)). The
Court held that the agency had the burden of showing that “it is at least
more likely than not that long-term exposure to 10 ppm of benzene pres-
ents a significant (a qualifier that does not appear in the statute) risk of
material health impairment.” It thus requires the agency to develop bet-
ter evidence of cause of the adverse effect (leukemia) and concluded that
“safe” is not equivalent to “risk-free.” Moreover, the significance of risk is
not a “mathematical straitjacket” and OSHA’s findings of risk need not
approach “anything like scientific certainty.” However, the Court did not
reveal what factual findings would demonstrate a “significant risk.” In a
footnote it stated that animal studies could support “a conclusion on the
significance of the risk” and that epidemiologic evidence, even if insuffi-
cient to generate a dose-response model, “would at least be helpful” in
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deciding whether a risk is significant. The Court based its remand prima-
rily because meeting the 1 ppm standard would be very costly. As the
Court stated:
“The reviewing court must take into account contradictory evidence
in the record..., but the possibility of drawing two inconsistent con-
clusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative
agency’s findings from being supported by substantial evidence.”
The Court refused to determine the precise value of “significant risk”
and noted that chlorinated water at one part per billion would not be sig-
nificant, but one per thousand risk of death from inhaling gasoline vapor
would be. Other federal decisions have taken the more legally traditional
deferential approach in their review of how an agency interprets a statute.
For instance, in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Fund, 467 U. S. 837
(1984), involving the interpretation of a section of the Clean Air Act, the
Court stated that:
“[T]he Administrator’s interpretation represents a reasonable accom-
modation of manifestly competing interests and is entitled to defer-
ence: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency
considered that matter in detailed and reasoned fashion, and the
decision involves reconciling conflicting policies... Judges are not
expert in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government...When a challenge to an agency construction of a statu-
tory provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of
the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice with-
in a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail.” (at 865-866)
Is there a minimum level of risk?—If the statute is relatively clear the
reviewing court will not allow much freedom to the agency. For example,
in the controversy surrounding Orange No. 17 and Red no. 19, used in
cosmetics, although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had deter-
mined that these additives were carcinogenic in animals, the individual
lifetime estimates of human risk were, respectively, 2.0 x 10-10 and 9.0 x 10-
6 (51 Fed. Reg. 28331 (1986), and 51 Fed. Reg. 28346 (1986)). The FDA
had concluded that these risks, developed through what it considered to
be state of the art (but with conservative, pessimistic, assumptions), used
in quantitative risk assessment were de minimis, and would not therefore
be banned. However, because of the express prohibition against all color
additives intended for human consumption that “induce cancer in man
or animal” (Color Additives Amendment of 1960, PL 86-618; 21 U. S. C.
§ 376 (b) (5) (B), the Delaney Clause), the court rejected, albeit with
“some reluctance,” the FDA’s conclusion of de minimis risk (Public Citizens
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v. Young, 831 F. 2d 1108 (D. C. Cir. 1987). Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 636
F. 2d 323 (D. C. Cir. 1979) (de minimis principle allows judicial discretion
to avoid regulations that result in little or no benefit) and Les v. Reilly, 968
F. 2d 985, cert. den’d, 113 S. Ct. 1361 (1992) affirms the prohibition man-
dated by the Delaney Clause prohibiting carcinogenic food additives.
EU’S “ZERO TOLERANCE” APPROACH TO SAFETY
The MRL regulation (a combination of Regulations and Directives
issued by the EU in the past decade) based on the principle of “zero tol-
erance” means that no concentration is safe if a substance has not been
given a maximum residue limit (MRL) (for Annex 1 substances). Thus,
for those substances unless the MRL exists for a subset of pharmacologi-
cally active substances, those are unacceptable. Thus, because limits of
detection are increasing (lower and lower concentrations are increasing-
ly detected by increasing accurate instruments), zero tolerance is equiva-
lent to zero risk of US law. The MRL is a requisite (Directive 2001/82/EC,
the “Cascade Provisions”) for the marketing of any veterinary products
used as sources of food for humans: if there is no MRL, then the product
containing certain listed substance for which there is no MRL is cannot
be marketed unless there is zero mass quantity of pharmacologically
active of the listed substances. Zero tolerance protects human health. The
EC Decisions 2002/657/EC and 2005/34/EC have introduced the con-
cept of Minimum Required Performance Limits (MRPLs) as a means to
reduce the otherwise draconian impact of the MRLs, when the foodstuffs
limits are greater than zero and their use in foodstuffs has been duly
authorized by a health agency in a third world country that exports to the
EU. The concern is that the stringency of the MRL may not fairly apply
to food products from third world exporters to the EU and risk assess-
ment methods may provide a more equitable way to control unwanted
exposures in the EU’s importing nations. Even though the single source
implied in EU law has been shown to be incorrect, for our purposes the
issue is that any blunt prohibition based on a LNT-like assumption can
still cause more harm than good. Moreover, as the REACH directive
specifically places the burden of proof on the registrant (namely, indus-
try), it creates a possibly insurmountable burden because it is asking for
proof of a negative. The zero tolerance principle also applies to GM sub-
stances or organisms. The EU Commission staff paper (2007) contains
discussions as to substances in which the residues are not harmful per se
but can be harmful when incorrectly used or are physiological products
of the animals themselves. We note that the approach taken in the EU
allows for extrapolations (sic) between species
The evidence of cancer (either benign or malignant) in humans can
consist of epidemiological incidence or prevalence data, in vivo animal test
of different durations, cellular and genetic tests all the way to the shape of
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a molecule or to the form of radiation to understand how the substance
affects an organ or tissue. This evidence can be uniquely informative
about the incidence of specific cancers (e.g., asbestos and mesothelioma)
in humans, but often cannot be fully explanatory of cause and effect. In
general we can think of weight-of-evidence, strength-of-evidence, modes of
action and so on to understand hoe exposure causes cancer in humans.
The EU and its Member States have different views of the importance of
that evidence and, more importantly, on the type of model of dose-
response used to assess the risk associated with exposure. In general, the
basis is an LNT (such as a MS model, for instance, in which the interpola-
tion to zero is linear from the lowest measured response) or a threshold
model. Notably, none of those approaches allow for beneficial effects at
low doses (Seely et al., 2001). If a carcinogen is deemed to act directly on
a gene, then there is no threshold for that carcinogen: it is characterized
by the LNT behavior (VC and benzene are an example because the evi-
dence is epidemiological). But there are exceptions where the approach
involves a tumorigenic dose (TDx%) that has been determined to cause
cancer in 25% (or less) of the animals in a study: the tolerable exposure
level for humans is 1/1000 times lower that the TDx%. When a carcinogen’s
mode of action is epigenetic, its effect can be characterized by an experi-
mental threshold (and thus the cognizant public agency uses factors of
safety to develop a tolerable dose for humans); an example is
thrichloroethylene. Some Member States do not use these approaches but
rely on consensus about the dangerousness of an exposure. Overall, the
variability in the use of dose-response models to set acceptable or tolera-
ble doses is rather extreme: some countries use an LNT model; others do
not, and prefer to use the NOAEL (or LOAEL) and thus use threshold, in
which the experimental exposure is decreased, through a factor of safety,
to establish a legally justified acceptable exposure.
Public information—Against this complex background of science and
law, the dissemination to the public of biased scientific information by
federal agencies became the concern of the Congress and led to the Data
Quality Act, DQA, (2002, P.L. No. 106-54, §515), amending the
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 USC 3501 et seq.). Congress’ concern was
raised by the number of requests for data from the public and the fear
that the information provided by the agencies that fall under this con-
gressional mandate (executive departments and so on) could be incor-
rect and possibly cause damage to society. “Information” is defined in the
DQA to include “statistical information”. The DQA was formalized
through its Guidelines (67 FR 8452) by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and. Specifically, “quality” is a composition of “integrity,
objectivity, and utility” of the information (67 FR 8659). On the surface,
the US EPA appears to meet with the OMB guidelines, which state that
information needs to be “objective, realistic, and scientifically balanced”
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(US OMB, 2002); 67 FR 8452)). In addition to reasoning about cause and
effect, under the DQA and the OMB’s Guidelines, US federal agencies
must use “sound statistical methods.” Accordingly, there is no limit to the
methods that must be used, other than they are sound.15 However, it
remains to be proven by the agency that its policy-making results in
“objectivity, realism and scientific balance”. For example, it is well known
that peer reviews can be biased and that peer-reviewed articles end up
being corrected or retracted. In the context of public decision-making, it
seems appropriate that the standards of review should be greater than the
standard of scientific peer review of journal articles because the stakes for
society are far higher than the mere acceptance or rejection of a paper in
the literature. Central to causal reasoning for risk assessment, investiga-
tions (e.g., Ottenbacher, 1998) have shown that peer-reviewed articles in
epidemiology commonly fall short of good statistical practices that would
limit false positives to reported nominal rates. Causal inferences drawn in
peer-reviewed epidemiology and risk assessment papers often fall far
short of the normative requirements for valid causal inferences (e.g.,
Ricci and MacDonald (2006)).
How to deal with the issue we have identified may lie in exploring how
a risk analysis can find a superior solution, in support of public decision-
making, when there is disagreement. Dealing with complex causality
involves often-irreducible uncertainties. The very difference in the mag-
nitude of the outcomes—for a given acceptable risk level—between the
LNT and the J-shaped dose response model has value: it informs the deci-
sion-makers about what it can be expected statistically and that informa-
tion can be coupled (depending on the law) with the costs associated with
prevention. The rational assumption is that that society wishes to maxi-
mize its net discounted expected benefits, accounting for direct, indirect,
tangible and intangible costs and benefits, and not merely the reduction
is risk, if any. As will we discuss, the conjectural reduction is risk associated
with the LNT—when it is the incorrect choice—does not reduce risk, rel-
ative to the alternative J-shaped dose-response model: it actually increases
risk precisely in the domain where it should not do so. In this context,
asymmetry of information remains important. Even though scientific
information and knowledge is open and can be carefully scrutinized and
made public through judicial proceedings, by agencies and authorities via
Criteria Documents, and so on, much of the relevant research is either
unpublished or the data bases are unavailable for independent assess-
ment, even when FOI legislation exists (as compliance can be stalled).
Moreover, the temporal aspect of open information inherently has some
transitory elements: evidence contrary to the published findings may take
years to become available (as the vaccine-autism 2011 scandal clearly
demonstrates). And, by the time this evidence is discredited, the percep-
tion of danger is formed and seemingly unchangeable in people’s mind.
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A EUROPEAN UNION INSIGHT: REACH REGULATION
In the EU, the REACH Regulation, which has direct force of law on
the EU’s Member States, has a very specific policy approach in which the
“polluter pays” and the “precautionary principle” combine. Nonetheless,
because of the need for a causal assessment remains, can REACH also be
causing more harm than good? The wording of REACH is that:
This Regulation should ensure a high level of protection of human
health and the environment as well as the free movement of sub-
stances, on their own, in preparations and in articles, while enhanc-
ing competitiveness and innovation. This Regulation should also pro-
mote the development of alternative methods for the assessment of
hazards of substances.
The REACH Regulation:
... is based on the principle that it is for manufacturers, importers and
downstream users to ensure that they manufacture, place on the mar-
ket or use such substances that do not adversely affect human health
or the environment. Its provisions are underpinned by the precau-
tionary principle.
This is a very different command from that of US laws because, in
Europe, the Precautionary Principle is an expressed concern that has
been a fundamental constitutional basis to justify environmental choices:
it trumps the effect of scarce information on potential public exposure to
agents that could cause serious or irreversible harm, (cancer or other
adverse health or environmental effects). If the EU were to use the LNT
because lack of certainty about a mechanism of action, the choice would
prima facie appear to be conservative and thus protective (at this point
costs of control are irrelevant because of the “polluter pays” principle.
Yet, the combination of both principles creates a paradox: at levels of risk
below 0.01 the LNT is unknowable—as opposed to being uncertain—but
the B-H is, as we have shown, not only knowable but it also be replicated
provided that the experiment is not biased to support linearity (for exam-
ple, an animal bioassay experiment that uses MTD and fractions of the
MTD, plus a control group generally fail to provide information about a
nonlinear dose-response relationship). Specifically, we cannot find evi-
dence for cancer that supports the LNT at very low doses. Thus the
quandary: how can REACH protect when it uses the Precautionary
Principle and when that principle is factually based on the LNT? Under
REACH, the evidence to be put forward includes:
Biphasic cancer models or the LNT
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... The evaluation of non-human information shall comprise:
– the hazard identification for the effect based on all available non-
human information;
– the establishment of the quantitative dose (concentration)—
response (effect) relationship.
... When it is not possible to establish the quantitative dose (concen-
tration)—response (effect) relationship, then this should be justified
and a semi-quantitative or qualitative analysis shall be included. ...
The REACH Regulation also states that:
If one study is available then a robust study summary should be pre-
pared for that study. If there are several studies addressing the same
effect, then, having taken into account possible variables (e.g. con-
duct, adequacy, relevance of test species, quality of results, etc.), nor-
mally the study or studies giving rise to the highest concern shall be
used to establish the DNELs and a robust study summary shall be pre-
pared for that study or studies and included as part of the technical
dossier. Robust summaries will be required of all key data used in the
hazard assessment. If the study or studies giving rise to the highest
concern are not used, then this shall be fully justified and included as
part of the technical dossier, not only for the study being used but also
for all studies demonstrating a higher concern than the study being
used. It is important irrespective of whether hazards have been iden-
tified or not that the validity of the study be considered.
REACH Regulation (EC 1907/2006) aims to ensure a high protection
of human health and the environment (OJEU, Title I General Issues,
Chapter 1, Article 1).
As REACH is a Regulation, every member state of the European Union
has to integrate it in their national legislation exactly as it is, unlike a
Directive. The question concerning the health risk assessment of chemi-
cals that fall under REACH is: How are the safe dose-levels determined? A
corollary question is: what is the flexibility inherent to using alternative
dose-response models, including those that go against the orthodox LNT
or threshold models? Clearly, REACH being an administrative tool, sug-
gest little flexibility—to avoid violating the Precautionary Principle—while
permitting the implementation and enforcement of REACH at the lowest
possible societal costs. According to Chapter 5, Health Risk Assessment of
the European environment- state and outlook 2010, “all human health risk
assessments of chemicals include hazard identification, dose-response
assessment, exposure assessment and risk estimation/characterization”.
The REACH Regulation requires that manufacturer or importer of specif-
ic substances submit their registration to the European Chemicals Agency.
Nothing is mentioned in the REACH regulation about this: the dose-
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response assessment is defined as “the estimation of the relationship
between dose, or level of exposure to a substance, and the incidence and
severity of an effect (CEC, 1993)”. REACH requires different procedures
to be executed from the manufacturer or transporter in order to “ensure
a high level of protection of human health and the environment.”
Part B Hazard Assessment of the guidance on information require-
ments and chemical safety assessment describes the different steps that
should be taken in order to warranty a maximum health and environ-
mental protection. Information about human health endpoints such as
“acute toxicity, irritation and corrosivity, sensitisation, repeated dose tox-
icity, mutagenicity, carcinogenicity, and reproductive toxicity as well as
any other available information on the toxicity of the substance” should
be collected and assessed. The information will be used to set the dose
descriptors, which is the equivalent of the well-known toxicological
NOAEL. That is: “If necessary, modify the dose descriptor to the correct
starting point and calculate the overall assessment factor based on all the
uncertainties involved in the assessment.”16 REACH contains reference
and language regarding the Derived No-Effect Level (DNEL), which
“represents a level of exposure above which humans should not be
exposed.”17 When no DNEL can be derived “REACH requires a qualita-
tive assessment to be performed.” Also, the guidance booklet states that
“for non-threshold endpoints, if data allow, the development of a (semi)
quantitative reference value (the DMEL, derived minimal effect level)
may be useful. The question that arises and is not answered by the
REACH Directive—and thus the purpose of this paper—is the efficiency
of such guidance for the application of the Reach regulation: again more
harm is likely to be done, rather than less.
CONCLUSION
When the stakes for society are very high facts should rule, not
assumptions. When an agency focuses exclusively on the harmful side of
exposure at low doses, ignoring its beneficial effects, it contradicts the
statutory mandate adequately to protect health. At low probabilities, effects
can be benign, rather than being as the US EPA assumes by using the
LNT. This situation demonstrably leads to distorted resource allocations
and to regulations or guidelines that increase rather than reduce human
health risks (Bryer, 1993). The problem is the default use of the LNT (as
the LMS used in cancer regulatory work in the US). Specifically, regula-
tory policy-science judgments should be scientific judgments, as exempli-
fied by the simplest set of alternatives in our statement below:
“the probability that the LNT at low doses cancer model is correct, for
chemical XYZ, is 0.40” against the “probability that a B-H dose-
response at those low doses is 0.60”
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Attitude towards risk should not be included in cancer risk analysis,
but neutrality should. If it were, risk aversion or proneness should be cal-
culated along with the risk-neutral information, on a case-by-case basis.
But then: whose individual aversion or proneness is an agency using?
A US EPA policy position is that this agency will examine and report
on the upper end of a range of risks or exposures when it is not sure about
where the risk of true concern can be found. However, it is not clear that
using defaults does help to assess the (true) risks in a way that improves
decisions, based on comparisons that use the same measure of success:
number of deaths averted. Rather, default assumptions may simply replace
an informative but uncertain estimate of the true risk with a less informa-
tive default number that carries a lower value of information (VOI) for
decision-makers. When there is insufficient information, it cannot be
decided that a risk is of a trivial magnitude (assuming that all stakeholders
agree to what is trivial, a legal issue) by a policy defaults. Using scientific,
consensus-based choices must overcome fallacies, long recognized in
heuristic reasoning, as well as cognitive biases on a case-by-case basis,
because some fallacies occur in some situations and other fallacies may
occur in yet other situations. More importantly, those defaults must
change as the state of the information changes. The decision-theoretic
approach with loss functions is useful here. Specifically, aside from meas-
ures of model performance, such as AIC, BIC, the important criterion for
model selection is that “a theory or model should be evaluated in terms of
the quality of the decisions that are made based on the theory or model.”
The suggestions and concepts discussed in this paper can be summa-
rized in a diagram, (Figure 6) in which each axis measures a degree of evi-
dence; the projections depict the overall societal value of the informa-
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tion, over the period t3 – t1, on the C-axis. This diagram is meant to be a
simple way to organize complicated information. The A-axis measures the
data (information) and the B-axis measures the causal basis for the risk
analysis and thus accounts for the mathematical and statistical aspects of
causal modeling as an overall index of outcome from an analysis, given
the state of the information at the time that the analysis is completed and
peer reviewed. The C-axis—a combination of the results from on A and
B—can be understood as follows: 1.0 means true causation without doubt,
and so on to the lesser standard of science-policy proof that combines
uncertainty and variability about the evidence in A and B; 0 means com-
plete unavailability of a data or a causal argument, respectively.
Figure 6 attempts to deal with an overall measure of variability and
uncertainty by depicting a stakeholder’s summary set of beliefs, in terms
of the US EPA (2004):
“The use of sophisticated uncertainty tools also involves substantial
issues of science and mathematics ... It is not, however, EPA’s intent to
suggest that full probabilistic models of cancer risks are generally fea-
sible at this time, or that the role of a qualitative presentation of
uncertainties should be diminished.” (p. 49)
We think that the implications of this statement are important for
cancer policy. We conclude that dealing with the uncertainty and vari-
ability inherent to cancer risk assessment for policy making should:
1. Not be myopic (and circumvents the admirable research done by and
for the US EPA), because Bayesian (and other probabilistic and non-
probabilistic methods) are now established in the peer-reviewed liter-
ature that their use can withstand the admissibility standard of Daubert
and its line of (US federal) cases dealing with the admissibility of evi-
dence.
2. Be consistent with advancing the state-of-the-art regarding ranking of
alternative choices and seemingly with fundamental jurisprudence
and administrative law.
3. Be consistent with the need to avoid making “conservative” assump-
tions when more accurate information and knowledge is available.
4. Avoid promoting default reasoning.
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ENDNOTES
1A legal presumption is “[a] conclusion made as to the existence or nonexistence of a fact that must
be drawn from other evidence that is admitted and proven to be true.” If specific facts are established, a
judge or jury must assume another fact that the law recognizes as a logical conclusion from the
proof that has been introduced. A presumption differs from an inference, which is a conclu-
sion that a judge or jury may draw from the proof of certain facts if such facts would lead a rea-
sonable person of average intelligence to reach the same conclusion. A legal conclusive pre-
sumption is one in which the proof of certain facts places the existence of the assumed fact
beyond dispute. The presumption cannot be rebutted or contradicted by evidence to the con-
trary. For example, a child younger than seven is presumed to be incapable of committing a
felony. There are very few conclusive presumptions because they are considered to be a sub-
stantive rule of law, as opposed to a rule of evidence. A rebuttable presumption is one that can
be disproved by evidence to the contrary. An assumption is a taking for granted of a fact or
statement without the need for proof (Merriam-Webster on line dictionary): this contradicts
the idea that an assumption must be checked after an analysis is done, if that analysis is based
on that assumption. This is typically done in statistical analysis: a model is fit to data and the
results are then checked against the assumptions on which the estimation procedure is based.
2The law has rather specific way to deal with the admissibility of scientific evidence (e.g.,
at least three US Supreme Court cases discussed later in this paper) that affect scientific causal
arguments.
3Formally: risk (lifetime cumulative probability of cancer death) = f(d), where d is a suit-
able dose or exposure. Thus, for a policy risk level, say 10-6, we can determine the associated
tolerable exposure, for example the acceptable exposure to benzene, in micrograms of ben-
zene per cubic meter of ambient air. The f(d) must begin at zero and cannot exceed f(d) = 1.00
because probabilities are number between zero and one, including these two values; the func-
tion is monotonic.
4Following Fayerabend (1975), what is needed goes beyond “some or many believe that...”
and results in a categorical, but contingent, statement such as “given all of the relevant and
robust information to date, we find that one or more X causes one or more Y to occur with a
degree of certainty about cause and effect measured by Z”. In so doing we obtain a plausible
combination of factual information and judgmental values.
5Symmetry of information knowledge and its processing between the parties is higher in
regulatory law than in tort law. In a regulatory process, evidence standards are more liberal
than in judicial proceedings and public participation enhances the ventilation of ideas and
beliefs which tend to result in an equitable information base. In tort law such symmetry is
lessened.
6Daubert et al., v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 61 L. Week 4805. The Frye tests resulted in
the summary judgment against the plaintiff; see, e. g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal, No. 89-1995
(5th Cir. 1991), cert. den’d, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992), where the scientific testimony about the
causal association between exposure to nickel and cadmium and colorectal cancer was exclud-
ed because it was not mainstream science. Some state courts have allowed into evidence scien-
tific constructs that would fail the Frey-type test, provided that they are “sound, adequately
founded ... and ... reasonably relied upon by experts,” Rubanick v. Witco Chemical, 593 A. 2d 733
(N J 1991). The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the scope of scientific testimony should
be enlarged, relative to traditional tort law, when uncertainty and lack of knowledge are pres-
ent. Later, that Court also held that there should be a thorough review of “studies and other
information to determine whether that information is part of that relied on by experts and
then there should be a determination of whether or not those methods are supported by some
expert consensus.” Landridge v. Celotex, 605 A. 2d 1079 (N. J. 1992), at 1086.
7In Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (874 F. 2d 307 (5th Cir.), 884 F. 2d 166 (5th Cir.)
reh’g en banc den’d, 884 F. 2d 167 (5th Cir. 1989) the court established its own “scientific stan-
dard” for determining causation from the administration of Bendectin and its consequent ter-
atogenic outcomes. The court attempted to establish a “universal” standard—statistically signif-
icant epidemiologic results—where there is “no consensus in the medical community” (at 309).
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8The Frye test (Frye v. U. S., 293 F. 1014 (D. C. 1923)) states: “(j)ust when a scientific prin-
ciple or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and the demonstrable stages is dif-
ficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be
recognized, and while the courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced
from well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made
must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.” (emphasis added by the Court). Under Frye, the courts generally have not scrutinized
the scientific reasoning leading to the expert’s opinion, but rather have directed their atten-
tion principally the matters (“things”) from which the opinion was derived. “General accept-
ance” is still at factor in admitting evidence, and a method that “has been able to attract only
minimal support within the community” (citing from U. S. v. Downing, 753 F. 2d 1224 (3rd Cir.
1985), at 1238) “may be viewed with skepticism” (at 4809).
9The US Supreme Court held that: “(t)o summarize, the ‘general acceptance’ test is not a
necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the task
of ensuring that an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the
task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those
demands.” (at 4810).
10Federal Rule 403 balances the probative value against the danger of prejudice, confu-
sion, and so on. In general, the assumption is that a jury will hear the evidence proffered by an
expert in tort cases (Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F. 2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1981))..
11Ibid, At 4808.
12Ibid, At 4808. The Court cites the American Association for the Advancement of
Science’s amicus brief: “(s)cience is not an encyclopedic body of knowledge about the universe.
Instead it represents a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the
world that are subject to further testing and refinement.” (Emphasis in the original; at 4808).
13Ibid, at 4810.
14Ibid, Chief Justice Rehnquist concurring in part and dissenting in part, at 4810-4811.
15Regulatory defaults and state-of-the-art science combine legally in many ways. Under
Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire, 322 U.S. 238 (1944), a US Supreme Court case, and more
current cases (dealing with fraudulent introduction of evidence by officers of the court), agen-
cies may run the risk of committing such fraud. That is: introducing evidence geared toward
supporting that disregards an alternative, equally or even superior, scientific theory prevents
the reviewing court from being able to balance evidence and reach a fair and equitable reso-
lution to the controversy. Not using modern statistical methods for analysis, while knowing that
such methods exist, may fall within the Hazel-Atlas line of cases. The clash between Hazel-Atlas
and City of Wauseka’s lax attitude towards causation is discussed in Ricci and Gray (1998, 1999;
Ricci and MacDonald, 2006).
16Guidance information requirements and chemical safety assessment. Part B: Hazard
Assessment (page 34 of 47) http://guidance.echa.europa.eu/docs/guidance_document/
information_requirements_r7a_en.pdf
17Ibid.
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